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BOOK REVIEWS
THE BASING POINT SYSTEM. By Fritz Machlup. Philadelphia: The
Blakiston Company, 1949.
When the Supreme Court, in April 1948, handed down its decision in
the Cement Inistitute case, a temporarily dormant controversy concerning the
basing point method of pricing flared into renewed prominence. When the
court, shortly thereafter, affirmed this decision in the Rigid Steel Conduit
case,1 a furor of protest broke loose in some of the more influential and
politically vocal sectors of American industry. As a result, the Senate Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (80th Congress) appointed a
special Subcommittee on Trade Policies-the Capehart Committee-to study
the problem of delivered pricing systems and to recommend legislation which
would remove the "confusion" and "uncertainty" surrounding the law.
Of all the legislative proposals which resulted from the committee's in-
vestigations the most significant was S.1008-the so-called O'MIahoney bill-
which stated as its avowed objective "to define the application of the Federal
Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act to certain pricing practices."
The heart of the proposed bill provides that, under Section 2a of the Clayton
Act (as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act), "it shall not be an unlawful
discrimination in price for a seller, acting independently . .. to absorb freight
to meet the equally low price of a competitor in good faith."'2
As this bill was being railroaded through Congress, two "crippling"
amendments were passed, one in the Senate and one in the House. The Senate
amendment (introduced by Mr. Kefauver of Tennessee) provided that non-
systematic freight absorption shall not be unlawful "except where the effect
of such absorption of freight will be to substantially lessen competition."3
The House amendment (introduced by Mr. Carroll of Colorado) provided
that non-systematic freight absorption shall not be unlawful "except where
the effect of such absorption of freight may be to substantially lessen com-
1. See Triangle & Cable Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 168 F.2d 175 (1948). This
decision was eventually sustained by the Supreme Court with a 4-4 vote.
2. As far as Section 5a of the Federal Trade Commission Act is concerned, the pro-
posed bill provides:
it shall not be an unfair method of competition or an unfair or decep-
tive act or practice for a seller, acting independently, to quote and sell at
delivered prices or to absorb freight: Provided, That this shall not
make lawful any combination, conspiracy, or collusive agreement; or
any monopolistic, oppressive, deceptive, or fraudulent practice, carried
out by involving the use of delivered prices or freight absorption.
3. Emphasis supplied.
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petition."'4  Needless to say, adoption of the Carroll amendment by both
Houses would have been a much greater blow to the pro-basing point forces
than acceptance of the Kefauver amendment. Therefore, in spite of the
fact that Senator Kefauver declared himself in favor of the Carroll amend-
ment, the conservative Senate-House conferees recommended adoption of the
Kefauver version of the bill. It was this version which the House passed
by a comfortable margin, but which the Senate-bent on the avoidance of
controversial issues for the sake of expediting adjournment last fall-post-
poned for consideration until the present session of Congress.
It is problematical how the bill will fare when it comes up for another
round of debate in the Senate. One thing, however, seems certain: the sup-
porters of basing point pricing will derive little aid and comfort from Pro-
fessor Fritz Machlup's recent book, The Basing Point System. It seems
equally certain that the opponents of S.1008 will rely heavily for their am-
munition on the economic analysis and legal interpretation of the basing point
system which is presented in this timely and authoritative work.
II
"Economic authorities sometimes are engaged in a shady 'prostitution
of economics'; at other times they indulge in highly technical theorizing; not
seldom they exhibit a refreshing degree of honest common sense."
Professor Machlup's new book definitely belongs in the third category. It
demonstrates with clear and simple exposition, brilliant analysis, subtle humor,
and sophisticated sarcasm the economic evils and monopolistic character of the
basing point system. Since its primary aim is to influence public policy on
one of the most controversial industrial issues of the day, the book is essentially
a polemical piece. This is not said in deprecation of the book or its author.
Indeed it is intended as a compliment to a distinguished economist who has
forsaken the opportunity of impressing the "professional grandstand" with
esoteric abstractions and who has consciously avoided what this reviewer likes
to call the fallacy of non-commitalism. The Basing Point System is a book
with a definite point of view, presented forcefully, logically and with a con-
siderable degree of objectivity. It is a treatment of the basing point con-
troversy that no economist, lawyer, businessman or legislator can afford to
ignore.
4. Emphasis supplied. This amendment was passed in spite of the vigorous opposition
of the House Judiciary Committee which supported the bill in its original form. (See
Report No. 869 to accompany S.1008, House of Representatives, Eighty-first Congress,
First Session). The support for the amendment was based mainly on Small Business
Objections on Basing Point Legislation, Particudarly S'rooS, Hearings before the Select
Committee on Small Business, House of Representatives, Eighty-first Congress, First
Session.
5. MACHLUP, p. 91.
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Professor Machlup indicts the system of uniform delivered prices in
concentrated industries on the grounds that it:
"(1) reduces the degree of competition in the sale of the products
concerned;
(2) causes wastes in transportation by encouraging shipments over un-
necessarily long distances and by unnecessarily expensive means;
(3) raises the level, reduces the flexibility, and distorts the structure
of prices;
(4) facilitates the increase or maintenance of concentration of control
in the industry;
(5) reduces the utilization of productive capacity in the industry;
(6) severs the price-connection between expansion of capacity and the
growth of demand;
(7) distorts the location of productive capacity in the industry by retard-
ing its decentralization; and
(8) distorts the location of fabricating industries by fostering undue
centralization."
For these reasons, Machlup recommends the abolition of the basing
point system in concentrated industries. As an alternative thereto, he
favors the imposition of compulsory f.o.b. mill pricing-at least until the
industries concerned have gone through a period of "psychological recondi-
tioning" and have again acquired the long-lost "propensity to compete." Only
by a drastic break with the past, only by complete abstention from price dis-
crimination in any form, does Machlup see any hope for fiustrating collusion
and conspiracy in the basing point industries. He adds, however, that in
industries where the concentration of control is not high "it may well be
possible to adopt pricing methods which involve discriminatory freight absorp-
tion without being collusive."' 7 Thus the guiding consideration in Machlup's
public policy recommendation is not the abolition of the basing point system
per se but rather the termination of the system under those circumstances
where it has been or can be employed in a monopolistic or anti-competitive
manner.
8
6. MACHLUP, p. 248.
7. MACHLUP, pp. 250-1.
8. Professor Machlup's position, in this respect, is identical with that of the Federal
Trade Commission. While the Commission does not consider the basing point formula
illegal per se, (i.e. when used by one or a few producers independently), it considers the
formula to become unlawful when it serves to implement collusion and price fixing
among all the producers in an industry. Thus the Commission holds that "the geographic
pricing formula, though not unlawful in itself, becomes unlawful by virtue of the unlaw-
ful use to which it is put" . . . for it is an "obvious fact that the economic effect of
identical prices achieved through conscious parallel action is the same as that of similar
prices achieved through overt collusion." (Federal Trade Commission, Notice to the
Staff, October 12, 1948, pp. 2, 3).
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Professor Machiup's conclusions concerning the manner of operation and
economic effects of basing point pricing are adequately documented with the
findings of several recert court decisions. They are richly supported by the
literature amassed over the last twenty-five years by distinguished economists
and government agencies. The Machlup recommendations, based on a careful
analysis of this literature, seem eminently sound.
III
Nevertheless there are two basic criticisms that can be leveled against
the author's treatment of the basing point problem, namely that 1) he under-
estimates the importance of structural organization in the industries employ-
ing basing point pricing and 2) he fails to recognize the basing point system's
virtues, from the producer's point of view, as an adaptive mechanism to the
threat of depression-born cut-throat competition. Let us examine these
criticisms in turn.
1) The first and most fundamental criticism of Machlup's book is that
it exaggerates the basing point practice out of all proportion to its importance
in the field of market structure and price policy; that it represents essentially
an attack on a symptom rather than on the disease itself. Nowhere does
Machlup give adequate emphasis to the fact that a pricing system is often
nothing more than a mere manifestation of an industry's peculiar form of
market organization and basic characteristics. As a result, he leaves the reader
with the false impression that the abandonment of basing point pricing is likely
to suffice in forcing highly concentrated industries to adopt techniques of
effective price competition.
Machlup seems to overlook the fact, or else he does not stress it suf-
ficiently, that the desire to curb open and direct price competition in an in-
dustry like steel, for example, is not likely to disappear with a mere abandon-
ment of basing point pricing; .for the attractiveness of geographical price
discrimination implicit in the system is, in good measure, due to the fewness
of sellers, the standardization of steel products, the significance of overhead
costs, the economic difficulties of entry into and exit from the industry, the
substantial concentration on the buyer's side of the steel market, and the danger
of retaliation and cut-throat competition in response to open price cutting
(especially when firms are hungry). A mere switch to f.o.b. mill pricing
will not, in and of itself, remove these factors which have made the basing
point system so attractive in the past.
Thirty-five years of enforcing the Federal Trade Commission and the
Clayton Acts should have convinced us that the problem of pricing goes much
deeper than most contestants in the basing point controversy are willing to
admit. The fundamental fact of life in such highly concentrated industries
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as steel and cement is not the pricing system as such but rather the degree
of concentration implicit in an oligopolistic market structure. From the
public's point of view it seems of secondary importance whether the effects
of collusion be achieved by means of a uniform delivered price system or via
some less sophisticated pricing technique. From the public's point of view
the basic danger lies in the concentration of control in the industries concerned,
and the power implicit in such concentrated control, rather than in the collusive
price making machinery which these industries happen to employ.
If public policy is aimed at the achievement of a competitive structure and
a competitive level of prices, it must go beyond the regulation of pricing
methods. It cannot rely on the fact that, quantitatively speaking, compulsory
f.o.b. mill selling will make the process of collusion more difficult than the
basing point system has in the past. If public policy is concerned with the
results which effective competition tends to guarantee, it must deal qualita-
tively with the types of structural organization which permit and encourage
the use of non-competitive pricing techniques.
The basic problem confronting us in our concentrated industries is
"size" and the structural significance of oligopoly. What is needed in an
effort to cure the disease is not the application of patent medicines such
as compulsory f.o.b. selling but rather the resort to delicate surgery-a selective
and careful application of the dissolution, divorcement and divestiture
remedy.' 0 A mere enforcement of the antitrust laws against restrictive and
collusive practices-while necessary and desirable--is not enough."
9. It is important, however, to recognize that pricing formulas in concentrated in-
dustries are significant in the sense that they largely determine the ease with which it is
possible for each oligopolist to follow the policies of the whole group. Thus, while it
would still be possible under the f.o.b. mill system for large producers controlling geo-
graphically decentralized production units to discipline local competitors without resorting
to a general slash of all mill prices, such retaliation would be more costly than under the
basing point system where a price cutter could be punished by the simple expedient of
establishing a basing point at his mill door-regardless of whether the dominant pro-
ducer or producers had an actual production unit at the site. (See MACHLUP, p. 218.)
Furthermore, under f.o.b. mill pricing, it would be immeasurably more difficult than
under the basing point system to 1) allocate leadership to one firm or a group of firms;
2) enforce acceptance of the leader's policies; and 3) communicate the orders of the
leader to his followers. This means that collusion or conspiracy-in the economic sense-
would be rendered more difficult, but it does not mean that collusion and conspiracy
would be eliminated, or even substantially curbed. Best proof of this contention is the
recent increase in steel prices, uniformly instituted by the major companies. This would
seem to indicate that compulsory f.o.b. mill pricing is not adequate to insure the absence
of monopolistic influences in the price policies of concentrated industries.
10. See the reviewer's testimony in Hearings before the Subcommittee on Study of
Monopoly Power of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Eighty-
first Congress, First Session, pp. 349-56; also the reviewer's proposal for an antitrust law
to implement dissolution, divorcement and divestiture in concentrated industries, presented
to the same committee, December 1, 1949.
11. It seems rather fruitless, for example, for the Federal Trade Commission to
engage in extensive basing point litigation with the steel industry, while at the same time
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2) The second criticism of Professor Machlup's study is that it under-
estimates the basing point system's virtues-from the producer's viewpoint-
as a technique for combatting cut-throat competition in times of depression.
To be sure, Machlup admits that "the wish to avoid losses in depression
periods is the most potent motive for cartelization in any form, including the
basing-point method of quoting identical delivered prices. If basing-point
cartels are liquidated, the industries in question may be threatened by losses
during depression." "But," he adds, "there is little danger that this will
'destroy' these industries.'
12
This statement disposes too glibly of a central issue in the basing point
controversy. Producers, after all, can quite legitimately question the aban-
donment of a pricing system which has permitted them to avoid the dangers
of competitive price cutting in an economy where depressions have been
a rather regular phenomenon in the past. Until we can demonstrate that
such dangers can be obviated without preserving a monopolistic and discrimi-
natory pricing technique like the basing point system, they are justified in
clamoring for a legalization of basing points and/or discriminatory freight
absorption.
It seems to this reviewer that most industry leaders now advocating a
legalization of freight absorption would probably be quite content under an
f.o.b. mill system, if they were assured that the full employment conditions
of the 1940's would continue indefinitely. What many of them, no doubt,
fear at this moment is deflation and the spectre of destructive competition
concomitant therewith. This fear is especially pronounced in industries like
steel and cement where a highly standardized product is manufactured by a
handful of large producers under conditions of heavy overhead costs; for it
is in such industries that price competition, in times of depression, often
degenerates into cut-throat competition.'3
So pathological is the fear of unbridled price competition in a business
cycle infested economy, that judge Gary, former president of U. S. Steel, was
even willing to accept a strict governmental supervision of prices as an alter-
native thereto. Said Judge Gary as long ago as 1911:
the Attorney General of the United States (pursuant to his powers under Section 205 of
the War Mobilization and Reconversion Act of 1944) approves the disposition of surplus
steel plants to leading firms in the steel industry, thus intensifying the concentration of
control which has made collusive pricing possible in the past. See W. ADAMS, THE
STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY, New York: Macmillan, 1950, pp. 158-60.
12. MACHLUP, p. 253.
13. It can hardly be denied that "any industry which has heavy investment exposed to
.the danger of cut-throat competition is bound in time to develop adaptive reactions, and
that any industry which can protect itself against this danger must have some control
over the lengths to which price cutting goes during depressions. J. M. CLARK, THE
ECON MICS OF OVERHEAD COsTS, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1923, p. 404.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
"I realize as fully, I think, as this committee that it is very important
to consider how the people shall be protected against imposition or oppression
as the possible result of great aggregations of capital, whether in the possession
of corporations or individuals. I believe that is a very important question, and
personally I believe that the Sherman Act does not meet and will never fully
prevent .that. I believe we must come to enforced publicity and governmental
control, even as to prices, and, so far as I am concerned, speaking for our
company, so far as I have the right, I would be very glad if we had some
place where we could go, to a responsible governmental authority, and say to
them, 'Here are our facts and figures, here is our property, here our cost
of production; now you tell us what we have the right to do and what prices
we have the right to charge.' I know this is a very extreme view, and I know
that the railroads objected to it for a long time; but whether the mere stand-
point of making the most money is concerned or not, whether it is the wise
thing, I believe it is the necessary thing, and it seems to me corporations have
no right to disregard these public questions and these public interests."
"Your idea then," said Martin Littleton of the committee, "is that co-
operation is bound to take the place of competition and that cooperation
requires strict governmental supervision ?"
"That is a very good statement," replied the Judge. 4
This statement would seem to indicate that the drive towards monopoly
and the institution of restrictive pricing practices is not merely the result of
original sin and human selfishness, but is also a desperate, though rather mis-
guided, attempt to cope with the problem of deflation and the danger of de-
structive competition concomitant therewith. 15 What then is the solution?
While we can concede that the fear of deflation constitutes a plausible
enough motive for the erection of bulwarks against the threat of cut-throat
competition, this does not mean that public policy must accept an artificial,
wasteful, discriminatory and monopolistic pricing system as a cure. The solu-
tion to the problem which, at its roots, is one of depression does not lie in
a return to basing point pricing and/or legalized freight absorption. Neither
does the solution lie in an acceptance of the Judge Gary formula. A more
suitable solution-and one which, I am sure, Professor Machlup would
support-is to be found in the government's adoption of appropriate monetary
and fiscal measures designed to stabilize the general level of demand (for all
commodities), in order to mitigate the violent overall fluctuations in business
activity. Given the assurance that, come what may, full employment will be
maintained, producer groups will be at once deprived of their primary motive
and most persuasive argument in defense of such restrictive pricing practices
as the basing point system.
14. See Hearings before the Committee to Investigate the United States Steel Cor-
poration, House of Representatives, Sixty-second Congress, 2d Sess., 1911.
15. See K. E. Boulding, In Defense of MonWpoly, QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS,
August 1945.
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IV
In conclusion, it should be noted that the above criticisms do not, in
any way, vitiate Professor Machlup's public policy recommendations concern-
ing the basing point system and systematic freight absorption. These recom-
mendations should be accepted and S.1008 (in its original form) defeated
in the Senate, because: 1) the bill would, from an economic point of view,
legalize a pricing system which facilitates collusion in concentrated industries,
results in wasteful cross-hauling of commodities, and distorts the optimum
location of both primary producers and fabricators; and 2) the bill would,
from a legal point of view, deprive Section 2a of the Clayton Act (as amended
by the Robinson-Patman Act) and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act of whatever effectiveness they now possess in combatting price discrimi-
nation the effect of which is to substantially lessen competition. If any
legislation is enacted to clarify the law as presently interpreted in the
courts, it should be some bill such as S.1008 with the Carroll amendment
included as a 'safeguard against the lessening of competition. In no case
should the burden of proof placed on the Federal Trade Commission in its
prosecution of offenders be made any more onerous than it now is.
As far as the outlook for the future is concerned, let us realize that,
regardless of the outcome of the legislative battle over basing points, a mere
abolition of this pricing technique is not likely to prove a panacea for the
monopoly problem in our concentrated industries. Abolition of basing point
pricing and/or freight absorption in such industries should be but the first
step in a comprehensive attack on structural impediments to effective and
vigorous competition. If we are to succeed with a program of that sort,
however, our antitrust agencies shall have to be equipped with more potent
weapons than they now possess. The Sherman Act is a blunt axe-a relic
from a paleolithic age. To meet the industrial challenge of today, the anti-
trust agencies must be provided with a set of fine surgical instruments.
WALTER ADAMSt
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY PROM PLATO TO HEGEL. By Huntington Cairns.
Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1949. Pp. xvi, 567. - $7.50.
I have long thought that "legal philosophy" or "jurisprudence" would
frighten fewer people away if it were more attractively labeled; "thbrough-
going-talk-about-government" is a descriptive phrase I once suggested., This
remarkable book makes the phrase apt, for Cairns here reports, with pains-
taking fidelity, much of what thirteen thorough-going, renowned thinkers
t Assistant Professor of Economics, Michigan State College.
1. Frank, Book Review, 52 YALE L. J. 934 (1943).
